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1. BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANT 
WAS SEIZED WHEN OFFICER KNIGHTON AND HER PARTNER, IN 
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY, APPROACHED DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE - WITH LIGHTS OUT - AND THEN, WHEN "NOSE TO 
NOSE" WITH DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, SUDDENLY ACTIVATED THE 
"TAKEDOWN LIGHTS" AND THE HIGH-BEAM HEADLIGHTS OF THE 
PATROL VEHICLE ONTO DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
The State, in its Brief, argues that "Deputy Knighton's action 
constituted a permissible Hevel one' police-citizen encounter, as 
discussed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(1968) ." Brief of Appellee, p. 9. In the course of so arguing, the 
State claims that "Defendant's analysis is marred by omission of a 
3 
critical fact related to the distance between the parked vehicles,1 
and by the nature of the lights2 used by the deputy." Id. at 10. 
The State's analysis, however, is marred by its failure to 
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Officers' 
conduct in the course of confronting Defendant's vehicle. See State 
v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1989) (''Characterization of the 
encounter . . . must be determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances"). According to the State, there was no seizure 
lfThe State's fixation upon the statement by Officer Knighton that 
the patrol vehicle, in the "nose to nose" position with Defendant's 
vehicle, was "maybe a car length or so away" from Defendant's vehicle 
is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances 
review of the encounter. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876 (1980). While the distance between 
the noses of the cars in and of itself may not indicate a seizure, 
the totality of the circumstances of the confrontational posture 
utilized by Officer Knighton and her partner together with the manner 
in which the "take down" lights and high-beam headlights were 
activated upon Defendant's vehicle, among other factors, constitutes 
a seizure. 
2The State, in its Brief, attempts to mitigate the show of 
authority utilized by Officer Knighton and her partner when the 
Officers activated both the high-beam headlights and "takedown 
lights" of the patrol vehicle onto Defendant's vehicle in a "nose to 
nose" position with Defendant's vehicle, which had been backed up 
against the barricades or signs surrounding the construction area. 
In short, the State argues that the illumination of an area by 
officers is not a show of authority sufficient to constitute a 
seizure. Again, the State fails to consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter between Defendant and the 
Officers. Defendant agrees that the illumination, by itself, may not 
be enough to constitute a seizure. However, when the totality of the 
circumstances of the encounter set forth below are considered with 
the activation of the high-beam headlights and "takedown lights," as 
they should be, there was a seizure. Interestingly, Officer 
Knighton, in the course of her testimony at the suppression hearing, 
referred to the lights on the patrol vehicle utilized in the course 
of the encounter with Defendant as "takedown lights" (R. 49, lines 
13-17/ and R. 53, lines 8-10). 
4 
because the marked patrol vehicle was "maybe a car length or so away" 
when the Officers' parked the patrol vehicle "nose to nose" with 
Defendant's vehicle and therefore it was possible for Defendant "to 
drive around the patrol car."3 
A seizure occurs when an officer "by means of physical force or 
show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a 
person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987) (citing 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876 
(1980) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1879, n.16 (1968)). "When a reasonable person, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with 
the officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free 
to leave a seizure occurs." Id. (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 
100 S.Ct. at 1877). 
The totality of the circumstances of the encounter between 
Officer Knighton, her partner, and Defendant are as follows: 
1. On March 3, 1995, at approximately 9:58 p.m., Officer 
Knighton, a Deputy Paramedic with the Davis County 
Sheriff's Office (R. 47), and her partner were patrolling 
westbound on Center Street in North Salt Lake (R. 8-11); 
2. In the course of patrolling, Officer Knighton observed 
Defendant's truck traveling westbound on Center Street 
"half a mile or so" ahead of the patrol vehicle (R. 48, 
lines 13-14); 
3The State's argument presupposes that there must be a complete 
blockage of Defendant's vehicle to constitute a seizure. However, in 
People v. Guy, 329 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. App. 1982), which was cited by 
this Court as supporting authority in State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 
882 n.3 (Utah App. 1989), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a 
partial blockage of the driveway and subsequent visit to the 
defendant's vehicle constituted a seizure. Id. at 440. 
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The area being patrolled was an open field area with some 
construction taking place on a bridge where Center Street 
and the Jordan River intersect (R. 47-48); 
As Defendant's truck approached the construction area, 
Officer Knighton "became curious to know where they were 
going down there" (R. 48, lines 13-17); 
Officer Knighton observed Defendant's truck turn and back 
up towards the barricades or signs surrounding the 
construction area so that the truck faced east (R. 48, 
lines 17-19, R. 51, lines 21-22), after which Defendant 
stopped the truck and turned off the headlights (R. 48, 
lines 17-18). The construction vehicles and supplies 
located in the construction area were located approximately 
two hundred feet away from the area where Defendant stopped 
his truck (R. 51, lines 1-13); 
At no time did Defendant or any of his co-passengers ever 
exit Defendant's truck and go towards the construction area 
(R. 52, lines 14-19); 
The Officers proceeded to Defendant's location "to 
determine why the individual had stopped there" (R. 48, 
lines 22-23). As they proceeded, Officer Knighton had a 
"suspicion" of criminal activity (R. 51-52, Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing), which, according to her testimony, 
was based on the construction equipment located in the 
general vicinity, the lateness of the hour, i.e., 9:58 
p.iru, and that criminal activity often occurs in that area 
(R. 54); 
In the course of proceeding to Defendant's location, 
Officer Knighton turned off all of the lights on the patrol 
vehicle (R. 48-49). Officer Knighton and her partner then 
approached Defendant's truck until the patrol vehicle was 
"nose to nose" with Defendant's truck, "maybe a car length 
or so away," at which time she then activated the high-beam 
headlights and what she referred in her testimony at the 
suppression hearing as the "takedown lights" located on the 
light bar on top of the patrol vehicle (R. 49, lines 5-17); 
Upon activating her high-beam headlights and "takedown 
lights," upon Defendant's truck, Officer Knighton observed 
three individuals in the truck - two males and a female -
who looked up towards the patrol vehicle (R. 49-50), at 
which time Officer Knighton stated that she "felt some 
movement, some secretive movement" (R. 49-50). The patrol 
vehicle was a marked patrol vehicle with law enforcement 
decals located, among other places, on the doors and the 
light bar on the top of the patrol vehicle (R. 53, lines 3-
7). In addition to the "takedown lights," the light bar on 
the top of the patrol vehicle had the traditional red and 
blue lights in addition to grill lights in the front grill 
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of the patrol vehicle (R. 53-54). Officer Knighton 
approached Defendant's vehicle to complete the 
investigation. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, as set forth above, the 
show of authority and conduct by Officer Knighton and her partner 
provided Defendant with no reasonable alternative but to submit to 
the encounter with the officers. Cf. United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 
1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987). The State's suggestion that Defendant 
could have ignored the police action and driven around the patrol car 
defies common sense. The freedom to depart, as the State suggests, 
was restrained at the moment Deputy Knighton and her partner 
confronted Defendant's vehicle nose-to-nose, at least partially 
blocking Defendant's vehicle, activating both the "take-down" lights 
and high-beam headlights on the marked patrol vehicle. Moreover, the 
confrontation with a clearly marked patrol vehicle and uniformed 
Officers created the unquestionable appearance of action in an 
official police capacity. 
2. BECAUSE DEPUTY KNIGHTON DID NOT POINT TO OR ARTICULATE 
SPECIFIC FACTS, WHICH, TOGETHER WITH RATIONAL 
INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THOSE FACTS, WOULD LEAD A 
REASONABLE PERSON TO CONCLUDE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED 
A CRIME OR WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME, OFFICER 
KNIGHTON DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
The State argues that Defendant's parking near a construction 
area at 9:58 p.m. combined with the Officer's knowledge of frequent 
illegal activity in the area justifies reasonable suspicion for the 
seizure. Brief of Appellee, p. 15-18. To establish the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to support a seizure, the officer must "point to 
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specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion," 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). Such a 
determination is made in light of "common sense and ordinary human 
experience," United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 
(10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1553, 1562 
(10th Cir. 1993)), and is made upon considering the "totality of the 
circumstances." United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th 
Cir. 1994). 
On page 16 of its Brief, the State, as part of its argument 
concerning reasonable suspicion, states that Officer Knighton 
observed Defendant's vehicle "entering an isolated construction site 
. . . ." (Emphasis Added). This statement of fact is inaccurate upon 
a closer review of the record. Officer Knighton, on direct 
examination, testified to the following: 
I observed a vehicle going westbound on Center 
Street half a mile or so ahead of me and they 
were getting very near the construction zone and 
I became curious to know where they were going 
down there. I saw them go and turn and park and 
turn off their lights — or stop and turn off 
their lights and I became concerned as to why 
they were in that area, knowing there's a lot of 
construction equipment, building materials and 
supplies and so forth there. And so I proceeded 
to that location to determine why the individual 
had stopped there. And in the process I turned 
all the lights off of my vehicle. 
(R. 48, lines 13-25) (Emphasis Added). Contrary to the State's 
representation, the record indicates that Defendant did not enter the 
construction area, but instead parked outside of such, which was 
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surrounded by moveable barricades and signs (R. 51). Further, 
although the construction area contained equipment and supplies, the 
uncontroverted testimony of Officer Knighton at the suppression 
hearing established that the equipment and supplies were 
approximately "a couple of hundred feet" from where Defendant stopped 
his vehicle (R. 51, lines 1-13), and that Defendant at no time during 
the events in question exited his vehicle (R. 52, lines 14-19).4 
A review of the totality of the circumstances and facts 
surrounding the seizure by Officer Knighton and her partner, which 
were articulated at the suppression hearing, establishes that the 
seizure and investigation of Defendant's vehicle was based on Officer 
Knighton's curiosity "to know where they were going down there." 
Norwithstanding, a Fourth Amendment stop based on an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or *hunch'" alone will not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27, 88 S.Ct. at 
1880, 1883. Common sense and ordinary human experience and the 
totality of the circumstances warrant that Officer Knighton did not 
have reasonable suspicion for the seizure in the instant case 
inasmuch as Officer Knighton did not, at any time prior to the 
seizure, observe Defendant or his co-passengers engage in any type of 
4The State did not respond to Defendant's arguments and 
comparison of facts of the instant case to State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 
674 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), or State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). By way of reply to the State's argument 
concerning reasonable suspicion, Defendant reasserts the arguments 
concerning the facts of these cases and how such establish the lack 
of reasonable suspicion in the instant case. See Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 19-20. 
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criminal conduct. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637 
(1979)/ State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); 
and State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's opinion so that Defendant's constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures might be effectuated. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which are matters of 
continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the 
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the 
area of search and seizure. The instant case raises issues 
concerning the facts necessary to constitute a level two seizure and 
reasonable suspicion, the development of which would be for the 
benefit of the bar and public. Counsel for Defendant further 
requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by 
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opinion designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for 
purposes of precedential value and development in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of March, 1997. 
,D & WIGGINS, L.C. 
Wiggins 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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